Monday, June 10, 2013

The American Misconception of Josef Stalin, 2010

In Thomas Von Laue’s essay “Judging Stalin”, he offers a number of very interesting considerations concerning how Americans are poorly equipped to judge Josef Stalin as a leader due to the vastly different socio-historical contexts between Russian culture and the West. Von Laue argues that morality is both relative and culturally specific, and that our own sense of morality is not applicable within a separate paradigm. In other words, before we pass judgment on such a controversial person as Stalin, we must first attempt to understand the cultural and political environment that surrounded him, and then measure his actions to that standard. Von Laue comes to the conclusion that although the costs in human life were high, the many atrocities that Stalin committed were justified as both a result of Russia’s desperate necessity to quickly modernize for their own self-preservation and a manifestation of the hostile environment and chaotic conditions under which he ruled. Ultimately, one must consider the fact that when Stalin came to power in the early 1920s, Russia was an incredibly backwards society on the verge of annihilation by its more industrialized European neighbors— by the time of his death in 1953, Russia was a world superpower.
            Von Laue begins his argument by offering the assertion that the United States has one of the most advantageous positions in modern history— we are secure from attack, we have a stable government, and we have “unprecedented affluence and power in the world”. For these reasons, we are not able to employ the typical American “moral imperialism” and judge a country such as Russia under our own standards due to its vastly different culture and history. Furthermore, a sympathetic reading towards Russian political brutality is difficult for Westerners to understand due to lack of shared experience.
            He then moves on to describe the political and cultural consciousness felt by Stalin and his many contemporaries following World War I. For hundreds of years under the tsarist autocracy, brutality had become an integral part of politics; a thought that is extremely foreign to Westerners. By placing Stalin and his actions within the specific context of his environment, Von Laue argues that brutality and ruthlessness were not only justified, but also a necessary measure to achieve the seemingly insurmountable task of modernizing Russia as fast as possible. Following World War I, Russia was devastated both physically and within their collective consciousness. Being a backwards nation with a barely functioning government, Russia needed massive industrialization preserve their existence.
            Von Laue falls into the school of historians that believe Stalin gaining rule of Russia was inevitable since he was the only one with a talent for dealing with the immense bureaucracy, being most familiar with the Russian people, and having the capacity to make hard decisions when pressed. For the most part, Von Laue establishes that most of the mechanisms (organizational and moral) that allowed Stalin to rise to power were already in place, but he was the only one with the capacity to take full advantage of them.
Modernizing and industrializing Russia was a near impossible task for Stalin, and he knew that by the nature of the Russian people, it would be difficult to successfully introduce them to a new way of life. However, to Stalin, the cost of delaying mobilization would be domination by a foreign power. Therefore, any sort of political morality was thrown to the wayside, and Stalin fully continued brutality in the Russian tradition.
Ultimately, Stalin is portrayed as a sort of tragic figure, set between “the most nightmarish” decisions one could ever make in politics. Although he was indeed a larger than life figure, he was still mortal, and Von Laue believes that he deserves to be considered as such. Despite his mistakes, Stalin did what he thought was best for his country in the true Machiavellian tradition of his “end” justifying the means by which he achieved it. Furthermore, Stalin is distinguished as a world leader that was under significantly more pressure for a longer period of time than any other ruler in modern history, and it is due to these unique set of experiences that the West is not able to accurately judge Stalin; since the West has always been at the top with their stomachs full, who are they to judge the actions of the poor and hungry, especially if it is for self-preservation?
I agree with Von Laue completely. He provides a very accurate depiction as Stalin being a product of his environment, and he does so without deflecting responsibility. In a sense, the triumph of Stalin in Russian history is a Pyhrric victory; he was correct in choosing to mobilize Russia immediately, and in doing so he not only defended the country from the Nazi advance in WWII, but an industrialized Russia played a significant role in the Allied victory. However, the victory in WWII came at the cost of not only war casualties, but all that died during the years of industrialization and collectivization as well. As an audience, we should take into account Van Laue’s observations about cultural relativism. Most people in the United States live in a very narrowly defined cultural context, and certain actions that seem very foreign to us are commonplace somewhere else. Russia has had an extremely different history than the United States, and thus cultural attitudes towards political, social, and economic morality are very different. The fact that he terrorized his own country is abhorrent to Americans, but when considered in the context which Von Laue provides, we can certainly see that he had to deal with a number of difficult, uncontrollable circumstances to accomplish his goal.


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