Political science paper, 2009.

Evolution and Importance of the Evangelical Right in Presidential Elections

Ronald Reagan’s victory over incumbent Democrat Jimmy Carter in the 1980 presidential election ushered in a new era of conservatism in America. The “Reagan Revolution” mobilized a new brand of conservatives- the “Evangelical Right”- a group made up of predominantly white, Protestant voters. This was certainly not the beginning of mobilization for the religious right, and they probably had little to do with Reagan’s victory, but Moral Majority founder Jerry Falwell claimed responsibility, and from then on the religious right has been considered a very important part of the Republican Party’s base constituents.

However, the religious right’s roots in fact lie in the Democratic party in the South. A series of events occurred in the 1960s and 1970s that were considered to be attempts to keep God out of government- that separation of church and state was “anti-Christian” and would lead to “great moral failure” (Dunn 204). This angered many southern evangelical Democrats enough to defect to the Republican Party. What used to be known as the “Solid South” among Democrats became almost universally Republican in 1968 and 1972 (Dunn 182). As seen in Jimmy Carter’s 1976 election (the only anomaly in consistent-evangelical voting for the Republican candidate), although he was a Democrat, he was a “born-again believer”. That was good enough to get him 49% of the evangelical Republican vote- and the presidency (Noll, Harlow 272).

The origins of the evangelical right lie in the aftermath of the civil rights movement in the Southern United States. At this point in history (late 1950s-early 1960s), the South was in turmoil due to racial tensions and the civil rights movement. Ever since Reconstruction after the Civil War, many in the South have been fairly conservative and wary of government intervention into their way of life. The largest religious influence in the South at this point was the Southern Baptist Convention, a denomination that was solidly Democratic ever since President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal in the 1930s (Dunn 179). However, southern whites viewed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to be an appalling intrusion into their way of life (Dunn 182). Even more so, evangelicals saw the US Supreme Court decision of Engel v. Vitale in 1962, which essentially banned prayer in public schools as an intrusion that violated both their moral convictions and Constitutional rights. Many were so incensed with the Democratic Party (who were partially to blame) that they left it all together. Come the 1968 election, the only southern state that the Democrats carried was Texas- Republicans got 69% of the evangelical vote- the majority of the remaining evangelical vote went to segregationalist Independent candidate George Wallace. In 1972 when President Richard Nixon was up for re-election, he was able to carry the entire south and garner 84% of the evangelical vote.

For arguably the first time, the religious right was making a noticeable impact in the Republican Party’s base. By 1972, it was estimated that at least 35 million evangelical former-Democrats had been integrated into the Republican party (Dunn 203). The resources were present, but the evangelical base was not organized- although it could be argued that they did hold some sort of set of consistent beliefs, they did not have a definite stance- as seen in 1976. Jimmy Carter, a Democrat from Georgia, ran on the platform that he was a “born-again believer”, and that he wished to restore honor and morality in an office that was still reeling from the Watergate scandal (Dunn 191). This was good enough for 49% of evangelical Republicans to vote for him. In a great political strategy, Carter played on Downs’ theory of spatial location to win the election. He never necessarily hid his liberal agenda- any secular, well informed Republican would have never given Carter their vote- but he played his religious beliefs to his advantage. As shown by the results, 49% of evangelicals (whether they knew his stance on issues or not) went across party and ideological lines to “put a man of God back in the White House”, especially after possibly the single greatest call to arms within the evangelical community in recent history- the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade in 1973 (Marsden 264).

            Although detrimental to Republican interests in the short term, Carter’s election spurred evangelical mobilization. After a while, the very same evangelical conservatives that helped put Carter in office realized that he was, in fact, very liberal. Many saw Carter’s creation of a Department of Education within his cabinet as trying to undermine Christian schools (Dunn 200). Also, President Carter publicly stated that he thought of “family in a broad sense”, implying acceptance of homosexuality- considered by fundamentalists as an abomination. Around 1978, secular strategists from various Republican-advocacy groups met together to discuss the gripping defeat of ’76 and what could be done in 1980 to regain the White House. With various local evangelical grassroots movements coming up around to voice discontent with Democrats, they realized the potential if all the different evangelicals were mobilized. In 1979, Jerry Falwell, Charles Stanley, D. James Kennedy, and Tim and Beverly LaHaye founded the Moral Majority in order to “take back our country for God” (Miller 35). Under the Moral Majority, Falwell articulated a set of central beliefs: “Pro-life, pro-traditional families, pro-national defense, and pro-Israel” and to “restore America as One Nation Under God”(Dunn 190).

            With Reagan’s election in 1980, the Moral Majority’s true impact is not well known- however, now mobilized, they could begin to be studied for patterns. Researchers began to notice a pattern within the data for this group, what would be called the “attendance gap”- a person who attends church at least once weekly tends to vote Republican at higher rates than those who do not. As of 1980, the largest group within the religious right was Southern Baptists, who were (and are currently) both the largest Protestant and evangelical denomination; they also hold the largest attendance gap for groups within the religious right (Noll, Harlow 273-5). Also, by 1980, regional voting differences had essentially disappeared- the majority evangelicals were consistently voting Republican across the board (Noll, Harlow 273). Growing faster than any other party base group, the evangelical component rose from 20% to 26% percent of the entire electorate between 1984 and 2004, with younger evangelical voters increasingly more likely to vote Republican than their elders (Noll, Harlow 273).

            The growth and strength of the religious right can also be explained in terms of party identification. In the thirty-year period between the 1940s and 1970s, there was fairly consistent movement of evangelicals identifying as Republicans or Democrats with some volatility in the pattern, for instance the presidential election of 1976. However since the 1980s, there has been a dramatic shift, peaking during President George W. Bush’s first term in 2000-2004. The best explanation of this is generational replacement of older Democrats by younger Republicans (Noll, Harlow 284).

            As I mentioned earlier, abortion was certainly an issue the further entrenched the religious right within the Republican Party, mostly because presidential candidates have professed their beliefs about abortion in elections (Stimson 81). While abortion is a very hotly debated issue, all conservative politicians know that Roe v. Wade cannot be easily repealed because it lies outside the zone of acquiescence. But views on abortion are powerful. Virtually all evangelicals profess that abortion and the pro-life movement is issues that they hold very strong attitudes about, and they could never vote for a pro-life candidate (Miller 34). This attitude is so strong that many evangelicals are single issue voters- they may just vote for the candidate that professes to be pro-life.

            Capturing the religious right’s support in a campaign has proved to either make or break a candidate in recent elections. One republican who has had a very hard time with the religious right in recent years is John McCain. Traditionally moderate (some conservatives will even say he is a “full-blown liberal”), McCain has always had problems adapting to the two-stage contest. In 2000, George W. Bush and his campaign advisors realized the importance of the evangelical base. Bush publicly professed his personal faith in Jesus Christ as his savior, and had multiple speaking arrangements at numerous Christian functions- including a controversial decision to speak at Bob Jones University. This decision was controversial because in the past, the fundamentalist-Christian oriented Bob Jones University had been accused of being a racist institution (they did not allow interracial dating, and for that reason only accepted whites for a period of time). McCain criticized this decision, and stated that Jerry Falwell and televangelist Pat Robertson were “agents of intolerance”, essentially sealing his fate in the 2000 Republican primary (Noll, Harlow 290). Again in 2008, even when McCain had gotten the Republican nomination, many evangelicals were still skeptical- he was too liberal, too secular, and most of all, too soft on his views of abortion (Miller 35). His choice of Sarah Palin as his running mate proved to be very popular within the evangelical base, but drew heavy criticism from the rest of the Republican Party (Miller 35).

            Overall, the vote of the evangelical right has been a very important factor in recent elections, however with a Democratic president and Congress, it will be interesting to see how they play out in future elections. The Republican party is already facing issues about restructuring their beliefs- are they pandering too much to the evangelicals and alienating the secular voters? Possibly so, and with the unpopularity of Bush (and Bush supporters- many of whom are evangelicals) this could change very soon. However, over the course of the past twenty years, it is easy to see that the religious right is a powerful force to be reckoned with when it comes to public opinion and getting elected.

Works Cited

1. Stimson, James A. Tides of Consent: How Public Opinion Shapes American Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

2. Miller, Lisa. “Evangelicals Are Crucial to Winning the 2008 Election.” Newsweek 14 October 2008: 34-35

3. Dunn, Charles W. Religion in American Politics. Washington, D.C. : CQ Press, 1989.

4. Noll, Mark A. and Luke E. Harlow. Religion and American Politics: From the Colonial Period to the Present. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

5. Marsden, George M. Religion and American Culture. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990.